Embers of the sublime : sacrifice and the sensation of existence. by Moore,  Gerald
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
29 October 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Moore, Gerald (2013) 'Embers of the sublime : sacriﬁce and the sensation of existence.', The senses and
society., 8 (1). pp. 37-49.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.2752/174589313X13500466750886
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis Group in The Senses and Society on
01/03/2013, available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.2752/174589313X13500466750886.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Gerald Moore, Wadham College, Oxford 1 
Embers of the Sublime: Sacrifice and the Sensation of Existence. 
 
 
In The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (2007), Daniel Heller-
Roazen traces the history of what one might call a feeling of being alive, a 
feeling designating an underlying unity of the senses, from its origins in a 
‘common sensation’ (koinē aisthēsis or sunaisthēsis) linked by Aristotle to 
touch and the stoic Chrysippus to an untranslatable notion of oikeiōsis. 
Cognate with oikos, meaning hearth, oikeiōsis designates both self-
appropriation and ‘the “first impulse” common to all living things’, the fire that 
burns in the heart of the living (2007: 37, 105-8). Overtaken by questions of 
consciousness and mind-body dualism, the interest in such a feeling falls out 
of fashion over the course of philosophical modernity, its legacy discernible 
only in its negation. The nineteenth century is marked by an apparent growth 
of ‘coenaesthopathic’ disorders, ranging from the documentation of body 
parts devoid of sensation to the dépersonalisation diagnosed by Pierre 
Janet. Heller-Roazen suggests that what is at stake here is a crisis of 
sensation, which spreads from madhouses at the margins of society to 
become pervasive across modern industrial experience. Twentieth-century 
philosophy perhaps testifies to a flickering or dimming of vitality:  
 
Are the great affects of the twentieth century, the sensible 
impressions discovered then and not before, not all feelings of the 
progressive retreat and vanishing of all feeling? The ‘poverty of 
experience’ (Erfahrungsgarmut) identified by Benjamin, the state of 
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‘being left empty’ (Leergelassenheit) said by Heidegger to define 
‘deep boredom’ [. . .], the overwhelming insomniac impression of the 
bare fact that there is (il y a), described by Levinas as an absolute 
‘experience of depersonalization’ [. . .]. Any ethics worthy of the 
name must confront the promise and the threat contained in the 
sensation that today we may no longer, or may not yet, sense 
anything at all. (2007: 289-90) 
 
The general tenor of Heller-Roazen’s argument overlaps with a plethora of 
concerns (dating from Weber) over the disenchantment of modernity. The 
ambiguity of the quotation’s final sentence raises the prospect, however, of 
sensation’s return, as if, hitherto obscured by metaphysics, it were 
paradoxically only now, after the death of God, that we might know what 
exactly it is that we feel.  
 The ambiguity opens Heller-Roazen’s work onto that of Jean-Luc 
Nancy and, ultimately, Bernard Stiegler. Much like the other names he puts 
forward as analysts of modern and postmodern disaffection, these 
respective thinkers of post-Derridean materialism locate affective existence 
in the decomposition of any ontological intimacy, which is to say, in the 
absence of the kind of privileged subjectivity that filled the place of the inner 
flame, or oikos, in modern thought. What Nancy has called the ‘withdrawal of 
the gods’ exposes us to an end of sensation that also renews it, by revealing 
‘sense’ – in both physiological and existential senses of the term – to consist 
in our sublime and joyful exposure to nothing. It is our finitude that makes us 
feel alive, and any lingering sense of our disenchantment can be traced to 
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our inability to grasp this fact. Stiegler is more pessimistic, arguing that our 
prevailing sense of disaffection is directly traceable to the collapse of 
metaphysics read by Nancy as our emancipation. The two are nonetheless 
in agreement that our sensory vitality finds its origin not in the self-touching 
intimacy of an oikos of the subject, but without – in an encounter with the 
limits of affect. The necessity of going beyond ourselves means that our 
existence is prosthetic, or technical, understandable only in terms of 
technical prostheses that serve to internalise affect, and whose very 
existence testifies to the absence of inner sense. 
Central to Nancy and Stiegler’s respective analyses of the 
decomposition of inner sensibility is an experience that Heller-Roazen, 
passing from Ancient Greece to industrial modernity without dwelling on 
modern aesthetics, problematically but unsurprisingly leaves aside, namely 
the sublime. He is not alone in this respect: recent critics have debated at 
length whether the sublime is still a viable concept in our contemporary 
aesthetic and ethical landscape (see Battersby 2007: 14-20). The problem 
bears, in part, on its alleged contamination by a metaphysics of the subject, 
which is complicated in turn by its connotations of sacrifice and terror. In its 
modern tradition, the sublime is not a feeling at all, but the sacrifice of the 
senses to reason, which translates into a redemptive, respectful awe before 
the terrifying monstrosity of existence. The Kantian conception arguably still 
retains a trace of the classical oikeiōsis, in the idea of an underlying 
(transcendental) substrate that, through the self-sacrifice of the empirical 
subject, allows reason to recuperate what the senses cannot grasp. 
Reworked by Nancy, who crucially rids it of its sacrificial structure, the 
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sublime comes to connote the ungroundedness of privileged subjectivity. But 
there is an ambiguity over what this ungrounding entails. Nancy seems to 
imply the prospect of increasingly coming into contact with a sublime 
‘évanouissement du sensible’, a fading away of the sensible encountered at 
the limits of experience, but in saying this, he comes into contact with what 
Stiegler has described as a ‘catastrophe du sensible’ – a vitiation of affect 
that is anything but sublime, and which, following the mass-murderer 
Richard Durn, he identifies with ‘the loss of the feeling of existing [la perte du 
sentiment d’exister]’ (Stiegler 2010: 89 ). We find ourselves caught between 
the sublime and the crapulous, in an ambiguous zone between two 
ostensibly contradictory experiences of nothingness. Stiegler goes on to 
claim that this loss is directly attributable to a short-circuiting of the sacrificial 
processes of sublimation that give rise to the sublime, at the heart of our 
culture of excess.  
   
 
Smoke without Fire 
 
Writing in The Muses, Nancy asserts that there is ‘no immanence of the 
subject [. . .], nor any ground of its luminosity’  (Nancy 1996:33/60). In other 
words, he rejects any identification of subjectivity with a self-sensing 
oikeiōsis, an inner flame or hearth from which the rest of our sensing would 
be derived. In the place of an oikos, he posits an ontology of finite, 
‘ecotechnical’ bodies without interiority, existing partes extra partes in a state 
of prosthetic interrelation. 
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The concept of ecotechnicity emerges from a working through of what 
Heidegger criticised as the global-technological nihilism of treating technics 
as an extension of the privileged subject, which seeks to immortalise itself 
through the use of technical instruments to subordinate the earth to 
presence (Heidegger 1993: 74-6). Nancy argues that technology cannot be 
understood as the body of instruments through which we translate our 
natural intimacy into the external world (Nancy 2003: 25/45). Existence itself 
is technical: ‘l’existence en tant que techné’, as he puts it in Corpus (Nancy 
2008: 101/89). Technics connotes what it is that comes to be in the absence 
of a metaphysical origin: 
 
‘Creation’ is the techne of bodies [. . .]. Our world is the world of 
technics, the world whose cosmos, nature, gods, and indeed the 
very articulation of whose system, is exposed as technics: that is to 
say, the world of ecotechnics. Ecotechnics functions with technical 
apparatuses into which we are plugged in multiple ways. But what it 
makes is our very bodies, which it brings into the world and 
connects to the system. [. . .] It’s in the creation of bodies that 
ecotechnics has the sense that we look for in vain in what remains 
of heaven and spirit. (2008: 89/78-9 [translation modified]) 
 
This account of ecotechnicity furnishes the basis of Nancy’s claim that the 
relation of art to the body should not be understood as one of artifice to 
nature, prosthesis to ground. In the absence of any oikos or oikeiōsis of the 
subject – in the absence of an inner sense, or what Nancy calls ‘a sense of 
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the assumption of the senses – that is, of their dissolution or sublimation’ 
(Nancy 1996: 13/30) – there is only the heterogeneity of multiple, 
discontinuous senses. Nancy reels off a list of the multiple senses found in 
the animal kingdom (thermoreception, electroreception, proprioception, and 
so on…) (Nancy 1996: 12/29). The multiple arts consist within this multiplicity 
not as the mimesis, or mimeses, of corporeal sense, but as distinct senses in 
their own right. As techne, the arts reveal the technicity of our ‘own’ human 
senses: we can no more appropriate the latter than we can claim possession 
of poetry, sculpture and literature. We exist outside of ourselves, through 
technical appendages that are appended to – nothing. Their discontinuity 
derives from the absence of an underlying ground: ‘technics is the 
obsolescence of the origin and of the end: the exposition to a lack of ground 
and foundation’ (Nancy 1996: 26/50).  
If art nowadays appears ‘exhausted’, unable to work out what it is any 
more, that is because it always already was exhausted, ‘vestigial’, however 
much we sought to bind it to the kind of metaphysical telos that no longer 
holds sway. In the absence of an intimate oikos, or ‘hearth’ of subjectivity, 
there is only ‘fumée sans feu’, the withdrawal of any supersensible origin, 
which is captured in art qua technics: ‘Certainly, for theology, there is fire, it 
is the fire of God and it is only fire that truly and fully is: the rest is cinders 
and smoke. [. . .] Art is smoke without fire [fumée sans feu], vestige without 
God, and not presentation of the Idea’ (Nancy 1996: 95-6/154). Far from 
claiming to touch the suprasensible beyond, the image (much like the body) 
traces the limits of sensibility, the impossibility of making contact with gods. 
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Aesthetics as domain and as thinking of the sensible does not mean 
anything other than that. [. . .] The trace is not the sensible trace of 
an insensible [. . .]: it is, in its very sense, the sensible tracing of the 
sensible [le tracement (du) sensible, en tant que son sens même]. 
Atheism itself. (Nancy 1996: 97/155 [translation modified]) 
 
 
Touching the Sublime 
 
Where once the senses were thought to return to the classical, fire-
connoting, grounding figures of the oikos and Chrysippian oikeiōsis, Nancy 
relates the tracing of sensibility to the sublime – an experience traditionally 
identified with the negation of sensation, the stilling of the passions. In its 
dominant Kantian conception, the sublime pertains to a pacifying encounter 
with an (infinite) magnitude that exceeds the ability of the imagination to 
process sensory experience. Kant links it to a non-sensory experience of 
negative pleasure, the result of a confrontation between the subject and 
Nature in which the former encounters in the latter an experience of 
‘reason[’s] supremacy over sensibility’ (Kant 2007: 102 [274]). In one of 
Kant’s more prominent, recurrent examples, the supersensible experience of 
touching upon reason is found in self-sacrifice, the sacrifice of all corporeal 
motives out of respect for universal duty toward the moral law. According to 
the Critique of Practical Reason (1788): 
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Actions of others that are done with great sacrifice and for the sake 
of duty alone may indeed be praised by calling them noble and 
sublime deeds, but only insofar as there are traces suggesting that 
they were done wholly from respect for duty and not from ebullitions 
of feeling. (Kant 1997: 72-3 [5:85]) 
 
Reread in the light of Nancy’s critique of any putative inner and unifying 
sense of ‘the assumption of the senses’, Kant’s account of the sublime 
stages the recuperation, through reason, of the transcendental unity of 
subjectivity, at the point where sensory experience breaks down. 
 Nancy reworks the sublime in a manner that draws parallels with 
Jean-François Lyotard’s reading of Kant. Lyotard locates the sublime in an 
impossibility of representation that renders it incompatible with any sensus 
communis (Lyotard 1994: 228/274). Writing in ‘The Sublime Offering’, in A 
Finite Thinking, Nancy similarly presents it not as the dialectical sublation of 
sensibility in a (non-)feeling of reason, but as the experience of the limits of 
sensation in the absence of any supersensible beyond. ‘The offering does 
not offer – despite certain pompous undertones of the Kantian text, of texts 
devoted to the sublime and even the word ‘sublime’ itself – the satisfaction of 
a mind capable of the infinite’ (Nancy 2003: 238/186). The sublime consists 
in an exposure to the limits of the sensible. ‘It is the sensibility of the fading 
away of the sensible [elle est la sensibilité de l’évanouissement du sensible]’ 
(2003: 234/180-1). It designates the syncopation of feeling in its inability to 
feel, a moment of rupture where presence withdraws and the imagination 
touches nothing. 
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If sentiment proper is always subjective, if it is even the kernel of 
subjectivity in a primordial self-sensing [. . .] then the sentiment of 
the sublime emerges from or is affected as precisely the reversal of 
sentiment and subjectivity. [. . .] This sensing is not a sensing of 
self, and in this sense is not a sentiment at all. It is no longer a 
matter of sensing, but of being exposed. [. . .] The sublime offering 
is the limit of presentation. (2003: 236, 239/183-4, 188) 
 
Rejecting the Kantian attempt to withdraw the sublime from the realm 
of sensory experience, Nancy makes another move, here, that Kant will not. 
For the latter, art is beautiful but only nature is sublime. For Nancy, by 
contrast, and in line with his rejection of a binary opposition between nature 
and technics, the experience of the sublime is ecotechnical, which is to say, 
both an experience of ourselves as technical, and one that is also created 
through technics, through the art that traces the limits of sensibility. ‘In truth, 
it is in art and as art that the sublime offering takes place [. . .]. Perhaps 
there is no ‘pure’ sublime, purely distinguished from the beautiful’ (2003: 
240/189-90). He also affords the sublime a relation to pleasure: ‘The sublime 
is that through which the beautiful touches us [. . .]. It is joy and not 
enjoyment [la joie, non la jouissance]. To experience joy is to be exposed in 
enjoyment, to be offered there’ (2003: 240/189-90). As the moment of joy 
within jouissance, the sublime is a moment of redemption in the face of 
exposure to the terrifying excess of existence. 
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Bonfire of Profanities 
 
Nancy’s most decisive revision of the sublime, however – and arguably the 
one with most import for his own philosophical project – is his rejection of 
any trace of its relation to sacrifice, as the self-sacrifice of sensibility to 
reason; the sacrifice of material self-interest to freedom. This is far clearer in 
the slightly amended version of ‘The Sublime Offering’, published in Une 
Pensée finie (1990), than in the original, 1984 version.1 Presumably adjusted 
in light of discussions of sacrifice in The Experience of Freedom (Nancy 
1993: 52/74) and ‘The Unsacrificeable’ (also in Une Pensée finie), the 
revised essay states quite explicitly: 
 
This is what Kant tells us: when sacrificed (ausgeopfert), 
imagination acquires ‘a greater impact and force’. But this occurs in 
fact at the very limit of economy. Sacrifice is inoperative there. 
Imagination is not sacrificed, it is what it is: the opening of the 
schema. (Nancy 2003: 237/185 [new translation]) 
 
The passage is in keeping with Nancy’s slightly later claim, in The Muses 
(1994), that art, nowadays, is in the process of freeing itself from notions of 
metaphysical destiny. What is at stake in the sublime is not sacrifice – a term 
that Nancy repeatedly takes to be contaminated by metaphysics, 
inseparable from the attempt to instantiate, ‘or ‘transappropriate’, an 
ontological ground (2003: 75/103). The sublime experience is of existence 
Gerald Moore, Wadham College, Oxford 11 
‘abandoning itself’, or ‘offering itself up’, to nothing, as finite. There is no 
metaphysical beyond with which to enter into exchange, only our exposure – 
through technics, or ecotechnics – to finitude: ‘finite and unsacrificeable 
existence, which is offered up for sharing’ (2003: 77/105). 
In saying this, Nancy makes a more radical distinction than Kant. The 
latter identifies sublime self-sacrifice with a sense of ‘enthusiasm’ and an 
‘astonishment amounting almost to terror’, attributable to the simultaneous 
fear and emancipation of being torn from the material senses (Kant 2007: 99 
[269]). But sacrifice and terror, insofar as linked to the sublime, are crucially 
distinguished from ‘fanaticism’ (Schwärmerei), which Kant understands as a 
‘maniacal’ and piously brazen ‘delusion beyond all the bounds of sensibility’, 
an excessive belief in one’s incarnation of metaphysical truth (2007: 102 
[272], 105 [275]; Kant 2011: 57 [2:251]). Understandably wary of the kind of 
theodic thinking that would see suffering legitimated, redeemed, by the 
promise of sublime ecstasy, Nancy seems to suggest that sacrifice – as 
distinct from its ‘deconstructed’ form of ‘finite offering’ (Nancy 2005: 
140n/15n) – already falls on the side of fanaticism. Where art qua technics 
simply delimits the limits of the sensible, sacrifice is the attempt to do the 
opposite. The sacrificial act seeks to transgress the limit that separates the 
empirical from the beyond, the profane from the sacred. His favoured 
illustration of this is the Nazi, whose sacrifice of the Jew performatively 
enacts the ‘truth’ of Aryan supremacy (Nancy 2003: 70/95; Nancy 2005: 
38/78). Sacrifice profanes the sacred by elevating the profane to the status 
of sacred, transgressing the limit of sensibility by purportedly rendering 
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sensible intangible metaphysical privilege. Sacrifice, in other words, 
performs the restitution of inner sense. 
 
In the religious vocabulary of the sacred, this crossing 
[franchissement] of the distance [écart] used to constitute sacrifice 
or transgression: as I have already said, sacrifice is legitimated 
transgression. It consists in making sacred (or consecrating), which 
is to say, in doing that which, by rights, cannot be done [. . .]. 
 But the distinction of the image is not properly speaking 
sacrificial, though it closely resembles sacrifice. It neither legitimates 
nor transgresses: it crosses at a distance from withdrawal, all the 
while upholding its distinctness through the mark of the image.  Or 
rather, through the mark that it is, it simultaneously installs 
withdrawal  and a passage that nonetheless does not pass. [. . .] 
Sacrifice effects an assumption, a sublation of the profane into the 
sacred: the image, on the contrary, gives itself in an opening that 
indissociably forms both its presence and its separation [écart]. 
(Nancy 2005: 3/14-15) 
 
Rather than representation, sacrifice is ‘super-representation [la sur-
représentation]’ (2005: 38/78). And it violates the sublime, by refusing to 
countenance the limit of sensation, the withdrawal of presence from touch. 
 The criticism that this aspect of Nancy’s work is undeconstructive has 
been made at length elsewhere (Moore 2011: 176; Moore 2012), and this is 
not the place to rehearse the criticism. One might nonetheless wonder why 
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Nancy, habitually concerned to rehabilitate contaminated concepts like 
representation, ontology and community, seems so keen to scapegoat 
sacrifice. In a turn of phrase that hints at a suspicion of residual 
haptocentrism in Nancy, Derrida has termed this methodological 
rehabilitation of concepts Nancy’s ‘sort of absolute, irredentist, and post-
deconstructive realism’, according to which ‘the Thing touches itself, is 
touched [la Chose se touche] even there where one touches Nothing’ 
(Derrida 2005: 46/60). Where Nancy locates the sublime in a touching of the 
limits of sensibility – a limit that sacrifice supposedly refuses to acknowledge 
–, Derrida’s point is that touch is also deferred, subject to différance. We 
cannot know that what we are touching is the limit, because there can be no 
neat delimitation of the sensible from the insensible, the sublime from the 
sublatory. The limit does not exist, except in representation, where its 
absence is sacrificed. 
If the sublime, as Nancy posits, is ‘perhaps’ not pure, then one might 
wonder whether sacrifice isn’t constitutive of its impurity. Would the 
redemptive moment of joy within the terror of jouissance not mark the 
sacrifice of jouissance, the sacrificial (self-)recovery of the subject from the 
brink of its destitution? 
 
 
Pharmacology of Fire 
 
An uncanny doubling of Nancy’s sublime ‘évanouissement du sensible’ is 
found in the work of Bernard Stiegler, who identifies contemporary 
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experience with a ‘catastrophe du sensible’ that coincides with the apparent 
destitution of sublimity (Stiegler 2005). It’s perhaps not entirely clear that a 
fading away and a catastrophe of the sensible would differ from one another, 
except in degree of intensity. The one designates the experience of existing 
outside of oneself as pure ecotechnicity, multiple senses without interiority, 
in a sublime ecstasy that falls just short of death. The other is not so much a 
touching of nothingness as its perceived and vitiating omnipresence. In 
Stieglerian terms, the ‘catastrophe’ of sensory experience refers to a ‘déficit 
de sensibilité’ – a disenfranchising anaesthesis, rather than an emancipatory 
encounter with the limits of sensation (Stiegler 2005: 75). Stiegler 
characterises it variously in terms of a ‘decomposition of reasons for living’ 
and a ‘terrifying reign of despair’ (Stiegler 2006a: 92). He has also 
repeatedly remarked upon its striking correspondance with ‘la perte du 
sentiment d’exister’, a loss of the feeling of being alive, an apparent 
nostalgia for which is exemplified in Richard Durn’s explanation for the mass 
murder he perpetrated in Nantes, back in March 2002 (Stiegler 2010: 16). 
This experience of affectlessness, Stiegler suggests, pertains not to the 
sublime, but to desublimation, or the short-circuiting of the processes of 
sublimation through which we encounter the sublime. As he writes in De la 
Mystagogie (as yet unpublished): ‘In its essential negativity, the structure of 
the Kantian sublime already contains within it the Freudian question of 
sublimation.’ Desire is created through a process of sublimation in which the 
object of desire is constantly deferred, kept just out of reach of the subject. 
The creation of desire, and of affect, is thus bound up with the Derridean 
concept of différance, which is always a ‘différance du plaisir’, a ‘deferral 
Gerald Moore, Wadham College, Oxford 15 
[diffèrement] of satisfaction’ (Stiegler 2006a: 84). The sublime is experienced 
in proportion to the différance, or deferral, of jouissance.  
The loss of the feeling of existence is thus bound up with the collapse 
of the deferral that gives rise to the sublime. Stiegler repeatedly links this 
collapse to technologies of consumerism, whose relentless and exploitative 
saturation of the senses leaves us affectively exhausted (Stiegler 2010: 29). 
Our addiction to heightened, short-term stimulation works to the detriment of 
deferred satisfaction, by short-circuiting the différance du plaisir. More 
problematically for Nancy, Stiegler also argues that the collapse of the 
sublime is bound up with the debasement of the concept of sacrifice, which 
he valorises positively as the originary technics of différance, the sacrifice of 
immediacy for the sake of constituting a longer-term horizon of expectation.  
Let us return, at this point, to the earlier theme of fire and the 
oikeiōsis, or inner flame of subjectivity. Although in agreement with Nancy 
that sense is encountered through the technics that stand in for an oikos of 
the subject, Stiegler is reluctant to renounce the thinking of interiority. He 
argues that the human is nothing more than an internalisation of our 
technical ek-sistence. ‘There has never been interiority – if we understand by 
that an original source unsullied by any affection. Interiority is constituted 
through the internalisation of a transitional externality that pre-cedes it’ 
(Stiegler 2010: 41). Drawing on classical mythology (the myth of 
Epimetheus), he moreover argues that sacrifice, understood in terms of the 
domestication (or internalisation) of fire, was the originary technics through 
which we arrive at inner sense, with sacrificial offerings to the gods being the 
means through which we reach beyond and thereby acknowledge our 
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mortality, placing ourselves between the animal and divine realms (Stiegler 
1998: 190/198). If sacrifice gives rise to the sublime, it does so not by 
seeking to collapse the sacred into the present, but by acknowledging its 
withdrawal in a gesture that also sublimates desire, by renouncing the 
prospect of enjoying the offering.  
 It would be wrong to think Stiegler immune to the concerns that lead 
Nancy to insulate ecotechnical offering from the kind of metaphysical 
contamination he deems inherent to sacrifice. His point is that sacrifice, 
much like fire and, indeed, technics in general, is ‘pharmacological’, meaning 
both cure and poison, ‘both remedy and poison but also poison and remedy’ 
(Stiegler 2006b: 115), irreducibly susceptible to the drift into fundamentalism 
of which Nancy is so suspicious, but also the only to avoid such a drift. 
Channelled in the right way, sacrifice presents itself as the solution to a 
culture addicted to immediate gratification. The problem, according to 
Stiegler, is that ‘youths need to sacrifice themselves’ for something (Stiegler 
2006a: 92). And if denied the chance to ‘participer pour sentir’ – to partake in 
the kind of construction of symbolic order that would enable them to escape 
disaffection (Stiegler 2005: 55-7) – then they will seek to attach themselves 
to alternative causes, alternative possibilities of sublimation. Nancy 
decouples the sublime from any connotation of fundamentalism, or terrorism, 
by distinguishing it from sacrifice. Stiegler, however, moves in the opposite 
direction, diagnosing contemporary fanaticism as a mere ‘fantasy of 
sacrifice’, the result of desumblimation giving rise to a ‘symbolic misery’ that 
is precisely ‘without sacrifice’ (Stiegler 2006a: 169, 87). Pace Nancy, 
fanatical fundamentalists do not simply profane the sacred through the 
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pretention to incarnate metaphysical truth (as Nancy claims of the Aryan). 
Such figures of martydom rather embody an ‘energy of despair’ that ‘tends to 
rationalise their destructive drives by projecting into them the return of the 
sublime’ to a world from which it has vanished: 
 
The energies of despair are not just a fact of lone terrorists, but of all 
forms of suicide undertaken, accomplished and not merely 
‘attempted’. They tend to be sublimated (and to compensate for the 
process of desublimation) at the cost of staging all kinds of 
massacres – they are liberations of the death drive in the pure form 
that results from the unbinding of drives, which stems from the 
limitless and destructive exploitation of libidinal energy by 
hyperindustrial capitalism. (Stiegler 2006a: 80-1) 
 
This is disenchantment at its most virulent, where the feeling of not existing 
becomes endemic and the affectively disenfranchised find themselves driven 
to perform a sublime they can no longer feel. 
 
 
Conclusion: Two Senses of Nothingness 
 
In the absence of any inner flame, or oikos, we are left, between Nancy and 
Stiegler, with two feelings of nothingness: the sublime rien of Nancy and, in 
Stiegler, the nothingness that lives on in the wake of the sublime, the feeling 
of not existing. Nancy affirms the withdrawal of the gods and the end of the 
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age of sacrifice, shifting twentieth-century disenchantment onto the 
persistence of the latter – onto the residual contamination of smoke by fire, 
of representation by the sacrificial. For Stiegler, by contrast, disenchantment 
does not stop with the emancipation of an ecotechnical sublime, but rather 
culminates in its liquidation. Where Nancy affirms the decoupling of technics, 
or representation, from sacrifice, Stiegler laments it. We create the sublime 
by sublimating and deferring desire, by way of sacrifice.  
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